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Kiss Kiss, Stake Stake:
Storytelling and the Philosophical
Pleasures of Season Seven
] AMES

B.

SOUTH

"ScoryteUer," an episode from Buffy the Vampiu SJayds seventh season written by Jane Espenson , provides the viewer with a story about storytelling in which the show explicitly confronts its own practice of telling
stories, and in telling the story of this episode, it suggesrs, I hope to show,
thar stories can point to what stands behind the scory; cal l it, for the
mome nt anyway, an experience. T he episode opens with the narrative voice
of one of the odder characters in the series, Andrew. We are provided w ith
parody of Masterpiue Theatre. We see a mishmash of leather books, antique
furnitu re, and pop cultural ephemera (Star mzrs action figures). And then
Andrew speaks.
Oh, hc:Jio. rhere, geode viewers. You caught me catching up on an old
favorire. It's wonderful ro get lost in a story, isn't ir? Advemure and heroics and
discovery- don't they just rake you away? Come with me now, if you will, gentle viewers. Join me on a new voyage of the mind. A lirdc ralc I Iii«: ro call:
Duffy. Slayerofthe Vampyrs, ["ScoryrcUcr, 8 7.16]. 1

In having Andrew provide us with a cha racterization of the series' thematics- adventure and heroics and discovery- this particular episode provides us with a curious perspective from which to view the entire series,
bur, perhaps even more so, a perspective from which to view the last rwo
seasons of the series. 2 It is this perspective chat [want to trace our in what
follows. In using the slightly ludicrous, childlike, hero-worshipping, and,
indeed, parroting Andrew, the episode draws our attention to the dangers
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of certain ways of relating to it. 3 These dangers are also ones that philosophy warns us against, and in setting these dangers out, I want to alert
the reader ro an intriguing connection between the way this episode asks
us to think about the series and certain impulses that have typically motivated philosophers.
The title of my essay refers, obviously enough, ro the famous collection of Pauline Kael essays, Kiss Kiss Bang Bang, which are words she once
saw on an Iralian movie poster. In remarking on these words, she tells us
char they "are perhaps the briefest statement imaginable of che basic appeal
of movies." In agreement with Kael, I suspect the basic appeal of Buffy is
all the kissing and staking that goes on, as well as adventure, heroics and
discovery. It is sometimes forgotten, though, that Kael goes on co caution,
"This appeal is what attracts us, and ultimately what makes us despair
when we begin co understand bow seldom movies are more than this."
The challenge of this caution is what I want to address in what follows.
Is there more to BtVS than the kissing and staking, or, more specifically,
is there an ything philosophical in all the kissing and staking?
I am grateful co find myself with this opportunity to reflect on a connection between philosophy and BtVS. The timing may seem odd, since
I previously edited a collection of essays on the topic and published a couple of ocher articles on the show. lc would seem that 1 have already
addressed the caution. Thus, I can understand the reader's criticism that
I have this sequence of events a bit backwards; surely, some general refiection on chis challenge should have occurred prior ro the writing of papers
on particular topics. Bur this paper is nor a general reflection on the philosophical value of BtVS, or what claim the series might have on che discipline of philosophy. Others have done some nice work on this co pic- I
think particularly of Andrew Aberdein's fine reflection in an unpublished
paper on philosophy and BtVS, and I do nor wane ro rework his remarks
(Aberdein). Instead, in what follows, I simply wane to try to open up a bit
more space for the interaction of cwo apparently radically disparate areas
of activity that I confess to finding pleasurable.
Robert Warshow has written tellingly about the need ro find a connection between his enjoyment of a Bogart movie and his enjoyment of a
novel by Henry James, although he admits that he has no idea what rhat
connection might be. H e does not wane ro say that they are simply both
pieces of art since chat is roo simple an answer. Any search for a connection, he argues, must be through self-refl.ection or self-knowledge since,
in hh words, "A man watches a movie and the critic muse acknowledge
chat he is a man" (Warshow, xli). Following Warshow, eben, I am the same
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person who watches BtVS and the person who reads Placo, Aquinas, Suarez,
and so many other philosophers. I want to try co tease out basic connections between these two activities. I do not want to beg the question and
claim that watching BtVS is identical to doin g philosophy. At the same
rime, though , I do nor want to cordon off my watching of BtVS from my
activiry of reading, writing, and reaching philosophy.
The most important objection the reader of this essay is likely to
have, I suppose, is to the suggestion that there is any connection between
BtVS and philosophy as anything more chan a topic philosophy can
address, as it typically and magisterially addresses any topic . But my essay
is not about the philosophy of BtVS, whatever that might be, and I am
not going to be discussing BtVS in the way that a philosopher might talk
about mind or knowledge. Also, I am not addressing BtVS from some subdiscipline of philosophy, for example, ae.sthetics. Nor am I going to use
BtVS to iUustrate or augment a topic within philosophy, for example, the
metaphysical status of fictional characters. In sum, I am not going to argue
that we can learn p h ilosophjcally from BtVS in the way that we can learn
from some body of theory or set of facts. There is no direct route from
watching BtVS to developing a substantive ethical theory.
After so many negations, here is a positive assertion: there is something valuable philosophically about BtVS, but for my purposes here, that
value has more to do with rhe impulse to philosophy and its practice than
with some version of philosophy or philosophical t heory. Following
Warshow, then, I want to show that there is a sense in whjch watching
BtVS can provoke and nourish a philosophical attitude.
[ still remember a class I took in the first semester of m y Ph.D. program. The professor spoke of the danger of presentism - the privileging
of present ways of doing philosophy over alternative ways. An awareness
of crus danger was supposed tO be one of the virtues of studying the history of philosophy. Of course, doing history of philosophy within a philosophy department heavily invested in present ways of doing philosophy
can be a dicey affair. Certainly, one of the lessons I learned from studying
the history of philosophy as the h istory ofphilosophy, and not a catalog of
errors, is that any present concepcion of philosophy is likely to look both
cramped and contingent. At the same time, though, I recognize that there
is an ideological use of the term present ism avrulable that would allow us
to ignore that which is current practice. My use of presenrism in this paper,
then, should be seen not as a way ro exclude contemporary insights, but
as a reminder that we can learn today from the past, or, indeed, from alternative currents of today's practiced philosophy.
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Let me juxtapose that warning to a neophyte student about presentism with a remark by a contemporary philosopher. ln his "Epilogue" to
the coUection of essays by Warshow, Stanley Cavell laments the unfortunate sense of the phrase "ordinary language philosophy." He states: "What
it [ordinary language philosophy] contrasts with, rather, is a jixaud philosophical language which precisely would preempt the extraordinary &om
disturbing customary experience" (Cavell, "Epilogue," 293).
ln this description, Cavell has given us a nice account of a danger
attendant on presentism- the cultivation of an attitude that preempts the
disturbing of customary experience. So, as a historian of philosophy, let me
just raise the possibility that one origin for the impulse to do history of
philosophy is precisely some experience of the extraordina.ry coupled with
a suspicion that one task of contemporary philosophy is to preempt such
experiences. Of course, I can only speak for myself, but it is worth considering just what the sources are that modvate those of us who do history of
philosophy, assuming it is nor some mere attachment to dogmatism ofsome
sort or a merely antiquarian pursuit. There must be both an attraction to
a fixated language, since we do learn our history within philosophy departments, and at the same rime some sort of non-conformist thinlcing, since
we turn our backs at least partiaUy from that fixated language. But the
impulse cannot be merely aversive; rather there must be something about
that philosophy occurring thm that we hisrorians find extraordinary. And
those of us who wend our way through that most neglected (by philosophers) of periods, the Renaissance, must be drawn to something there that
cannot be captured by the fixated language of philosophy today.
Earlier, I quoted Andrew's invitation to the viewer at the beginning
of"Sroryreller." After the invitation, he proceeds to describe an encounter
between Buffy and some vampires from the previous night : "Ouch! My
goodness! Things look bad for the Slayer, don't they? She didn't see that
second vampire, concealed by cover of darkness, ready -(there's a knock
at the door; Andrew ignores it) ready co attack and make her his own vampirical spawn." The knock on the door disturbs Andrew, causing him
momentary confusion before crying to talk over it, but also warns the
viewer that there is ano ther perspective from which to view what Andrew
recounts. Indeed, poinc of view changes with a cut to Andrew, sitting on
a closed toiler seat, camera in front of him . The viewer now realizes Andrew
is not in charge of the story we will be watching. Anya opens the door
and asks Andrew what be has been doing in the bathroom for thirty minutes. "Entertaining and educating," is his response. To which Anya says:
"Why can't you just masrurbate like the rest of us?"
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Andrew's answer and Anya's response get to che central issue of chis
essay: can ceiling a srory entertain and educate? The fact that the episode
so clearly brings this issue up for our consideration in rurn suggests chat
there is not an obvious affirmative answer. lf there is to be an affirmative
answer, though, we have been put on warning to resist a certain kind of
story, the sort with which Andrew began and which is effectively equivalent to masturbation. The remainder of the episode, chen, might provide
us with an alternative story, one in which Andrew is educated into a different perspective. Thus, one philosophical task of this episode is to provide Andrew, and by extension, any viewer, a counter-story co some
standard story in much the same way that some venues of doing philosophy provide a counter to presentism. It is this concern about a fixated
philosophical language that encourages me to think about BtVS as providing us with some philosophical work co do. I want to worry about chis
work in two ways. T he first issue I want to worry about is the issue of
experience. Warshow is concerned to explore the ways chat experience is
blocked by "customary experience." The point is chat customary experience is nor real experience after all, and what we must do is fight against
the ways that the customary fo rms of choughc m ilitate against what
Warshow calls "the immediace experience."
Consider the followi ng passage from John Sruan Mill's On Lib~rty:
[n our times, from the highest class of sociery down ro the lowest every one
lives as under the eye of a hos tile and dreaded censorship. Nor only in what concerns others, bur in what concerns only themselves, the individual, or rhe family,
do not ask themselves - what do I prefer? or, what would suir my character and
disposition? or, what would allow the best and highest in me ro have fai r play,
and enable ir ro grow and thrive? They ask themselves, what is suitable ro my
position? whar is usu,aJiy done by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances? or (worse srill) what is usu_ally done by persons of a station and circumseances superior ro mine? I do nor mean that they choose whar is customary, in
preference ro whar suits their own inclination. It docs nor occur to them ro have
any inclination, except for whar is customary. Thus rhc mind itself is bowed ro
the yoke: even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is the first thing
thought of; rhey like in crowds; they exercise choice only among things commonly done: peculiarity of rasrc, eccentricity of conduct, a.re shunned equally
with crimes: umil by dinr of not following their own narure, they have no
narurc ro follow: their human capacities are withered and starved: they become
incapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and are generally without
either opinions or feelings of home growth, or properly their own. Now is this,
or is ir not, the desirable condirion of human nature? (Mill, 61-62].

In choosing the customary, in conforming to what is commonly done,
we block ourselves from experience as Wars how calks of it. In Mill's terms,
we lose peculiarity of taste and eccentricity of conduct. In short, we lose
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a sense of ourselves as manifested in our capacities and talents. Anya's
accusation against Andrew's Masurpiece Theatre version of Buffy, Slayer of
the Vampyres (both entertaining and educational!) is that it is masrurbarory - a nice gloss on Mill's claim that conformiry renders us "incapable
of any strong wishes or native pleasures."
The problem with "immediate experience," though, is that words
typically fail to capture it. Warshaw talks. of the writer having co invem
his own audience for describing experience and adds that there is simply
no vocabulary available in which to discuss such experience ( p. xlii). This
strikes me as an extreme version of the complaint alleged against presenrism, but ic seems true of my experience of many things relating co BtVS.
And that leads me ro the second issue: how can I show that BtVS is worrh
the effort? Again, a quote from Cavell (we historians stand behind our quotations in both obvious senses of "stand behind" -what we quote, who
we quote, says more than we chink we can say d irectly- an analogous
concern to Warshaw's lack of a vocabulary): "Nothing can show this value
to you unless it is discovered in your own experience, in the persisrenr exercise of your own caste" (Conditions, 10- ll). And now we're ac the thorny
question of taste and its objects. In the words of Chris Lehmann, "Taste
[is] a function of subjectivity; cultural hierarchy is a gauge of that subjectivity's erosion" (63). In Mill's terms, then, there is no peculiarity of caste
without resistance to conformity, and taste as typically exercised subsumes
the individual's taste under some group's taste. Often, indeed, as Mill
points out, that taste is the taste of"persons of a station and circumstances
superior" to the one who exercises a judgmenr of taste. Taking my cues
then, from Mill, "Sroryceller," and Warshaw, I will resist one way of conforming. While I can recognize that BtVS is not Plato, there is no reason
why 1 should not bring my philosophically trained caste to bear on it as I
do Plato. Of course, if my taste is legitimately mine, and nor one belonging to some other group, it is nor therefore baseless. At the same rime,
though, I cannot assume anyone else will share that taste unless I show
them its basis. My approach to BtVS might be idiosyncratic, bur no less
philosophical, unless we consider only the fixated philosophy current
among us.
Barry Stroud put his finger on one good reason to be wary of conforming to coday's philosophical atmosphere when he wrote: "But I think
the professionalized, scienristic concepcion that many people now have of
how to proceed in philosophy is unfortunate .... I would say chat it is compatible at a certain point with the absence of philosophy. It has led to what
I think is a certain complacency, even a certain blindness, in the face of
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what remains philosophically importam," (Stroud, 38-39). Now, I juxtapose Stroud's comment with a passage from Montaigne's Ofphysiognomy:
Almost aU the opinions we hav·e are taken on authority and on credit. There is
no harm in this: we could nor make a worse choice than our own in so feeble an
age. The version of the sayings of Socrates that his friends have left us we
approve only out of respect for the universal approval these sayings enjoy, nor by
our own knowledge. They are beyond our experience. If anything of the kind
were brought forth at this time, there are few men who would prize it.
We perceive no charms that are not sharpened, puffed our, and inHated by
artifice. Those which glide along naturally and simply easily escape a sight so
gross as ours. They have a delicate and hidden beaury; we need a clear and weUpurgcd sight ro discover their secEct llght. Is nor naturalness, according to us,
akin ro srupidiry and a maner for reproach? [792).

The "blindness" that Stroud speaks of echoes Momaigne's claim that some
charms, which are not inflated by artifice, "escape our sight." Stroud's
"complacency" parallels Moncaigne's "universal approval," and both ace in
the same conceptual territory as Mill's "conformity. " Both Stroud and
Montaigne ace clearly inhabiting a world in which judgments ought not
be subsumed under some other group's judgmenc. Thus, there is an interesting congruence in their respective complaints about the practice of philosophy current in their times, one that is captured nicely by Mill's concern
about the "hostile and dreaded censorship" of conformity. Both Stroud
and Momaigne offer an anchori.ng point from which to bring peculiarity
back to philosophy. For Stroud, "There must be something we are involved
in that is not philosophy. In reflecting on such things philosophically we
have to have the strength to recognize and hold on to such things, and
not to distort or deny them , in the face of philosophical reflection"
(43-44). For Montaigne, it is those charms that "glide along naturally and
simply." Both authors, then, co:ntrast what is natural to the damage that
philosophical artifice can do to our experience. They both point co a reality that is apparently available co experience and that is pre- philosophical. Bur here's the thing: Montaigne is nothing if oot an artful writer, a
thinker who uses multiple rhetorical tricks to drive home the lesson that
the best we can do is remain within our powers and follow nature. Stroud,
in turn, is a wdl-respecred contemporary philosopher. There's something
suspiciously paradoxical here. The construction of Warshaw's hoped-for
vocabulary is a philosophical , o.r at least theoretical task, bur if philosophy itself blocks the possibility of that vocabulary, what ace we to do?
"Storyteller" has a comparable set of concerns to those found in
Warshaw, Cavell, Mill, Montaigne, and Stroud: the ways that artifice
blocks experience, thereby promoting blindness and an avoidance of the
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narural, or, perhaps better, rhe pre-theoretical. "Storyteller" begins by
entertaining and educacing in the Masterpiece Theatre manner. Andrew's
narration of Buffy's actions are accurately characterized by Montaigne's
terms: sharpened, puffed out, and inflated by artifice. Anya's subsequent
deBating of Andrew's artifice as masturbatory is unsettling. Haven't viewers been watching the show for six and a half seasons precisely for "adventure and heroics and djscovery?" Surely, the kissing and the staking have
been essential to the pleasures viewers have taken from the series, but the
higher pleasures of educational television have been present as well. Viewers have applauded the moral complexity of the sh ow, and have seen various characters as role models.
Anya's deflation of pretension sets the stage for t he theme of the
episode: a self-reBective, highly critical account of the way the stories we
tell, caJl them fixated ideas, are worth less than something simple and natural. It also seems to have a big idea present in it as we see Andrew's quest
for redemption. Accordingly, for all irs apparent criticism of stories, the
episode also teJls a story. As the episode progresses, we continue to see
Andrew inflating his own story and the story of the other characters. Thus,
we see Andrew the supervillaio, the Andrew who once defeated Dark Willow. So, too, we see Spike being filmed by Andrew. Spike's response, which
seems consistent with a standard story about his character, "I thought I
told you co piss off with this bloody camera, yet here you are again with
that thing in my face. Would you sod off (flicks the cigarette at Andrew)
before I rip your throat out and eat -" is cut off when Andrew explains
that the lighting was wrong. We see that Spike is as invested in an artificial
image as Andrew.
We, the loyal viewers, recognize these fabri cations as we see them,
thus thinking that we are in on the joke. On that level, the story is simply funny. We go on , though, co find out that in the "real" world of the
show, students at Sunnydale High are acting bizarrely, but bizarrely in a
recognizable way. It turns out that they are behaving in ways chat students
behaved in earlier seasons of the show. In those earlier episod es, Buffy and
her friends were victorious. Now, we are being asked to call into question
those earlier srories. Did they end as neatly as we thought they did? T he
joke we thought we were in on is suddenly a little less fu nny, and we are
made a bit uncomforcable in our ready acceptance of those prior stories.
T he narrative of "Storyteller" includes an additional confrontation
with storytelling in dealing with the relationship between Xander and
Anya. In their taped conversation with Andrew on the one year anniversary ofXander's decision to leave Anya at the altar, Xander keeps dodg-
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ing the question of whether he still loves Anya. In frustration , Anya stares,
"And here's where we hop on the merry-go-round of rotating knives. I
blame you, and you blame me, and we both end up all cut ro shreds.
Please just teU - Do you still love me?" Xander replies that he does, but
that he does nor "know if that means anything for us anymore. " Anya
confirms that she scillloves Xander, bur concludes: "I don't know if that
means anything either." Even with an attestation of their unique love for
one another, there is no story to be told of their relationship. Andrew, who
both accepts and tells stories rewatches the conversation on tape, crying
all the while. Yet later in the episode, when we see Xander and Anya in
bed after "one more rime sex," we understand chat there will be no happy
ending for them. Within the overall theme of the episode, what we gee in
this sub-plot is a reminder that happy endings are the stuffof stories. More
tellingly, perhaps, they are patterns of conformity. If one loves someone
and that love is returned, surely the "happily ever after follows." Yet Xander and Anya represent a more natural, less artificial, experience of love.
Anya's final line in this scene is especially striking: "I think maybe we're
really over. Which is- it's good, right? I mean, now we can move on. "
Despite her experience of"one more rime" sex with Xander, she insists on
subsuming the experience under a story- their is experience is good
because it means they can move on. Yet, as we know, that's not what happens. Within a few episodes, Anya is killed, which makes the poignancy
of her inability to appreciate the experience for what it was all the more
painful in rewatching.
The main story of this episode about storytelling, though, remains.
Ir is the story of Andrew's "redemption." In an attempt to dose the "seal
of Danzalthar," the conduit for the evil causing the mayhem at the high
school, Buffy and her friends discover that Andrew himself was responsible for opening the seal. Under the influence of another story told by the
Fim Evil, he had killed his friend Jonathan at the seal and Jonathan's blood
was the mechanism by which the seal was opened. The promise of the story
told to Andrew was that once Jonathan was sacrificed, Andrew, Jonathan,
and their friend Warren would "live as gods." Buffy takes Andrew back co
the seal where she tells him, "Yeah, Willow did a little research. Turns our,
rhe blood of the person char awoke ir - you - di1ferent kind of deal. It
reverses rhe whole thing." Andrew replies "So, this is my redemption at
last? I buy back my bruised soul with the blood of my heart. Bur-bur nor
enough to kill."
Here we have Andrew tellin g himself a story about the notion of
redemption. Buffy calls him on it: "You always do this. You make every-
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thing into a story so no one's responsible for anything because they're just
following a script. "
The warning is d ear: telling a story about our life can be a matter of
following a script and, thus, a way of avoiding responsibility, denying
experience. Indeed, Andrew goes on to try to displace responsibility for
his actions. He claims that he was told Jonathan would be OK and that
Jonathan's death would be temporary. And in Listening to that story, he
"lost his friend." Notice that he continues ro avoid responsibility: be was
deceived, and by that deception, he lost .his friend. Bulfy rightly points
out in response that Andrew murdered his friend, and he admits it. H e
then points out that he also believes Buffy's stories that she has been telling
those she was training to 6ght with her. Buffy's response is poinced: "This
isn't some story where good triumphs because good triumphs. Good people are going to die! Girls. Maybe me. Probably you. Probably right now."
Buffy tells stories and she knows that those stories are false , char they conceal the reality of the sicuation. In this exchange, ir becomes clear that
Buffy's storytelling is a counterpart to the storytelling of the First Evil.
How are we ro decide between the stories? How is Buffy's sroryteUing any
less culpable that thar of the First Evil? Presumably, there is a question of
inrent. The First wanted Andrew to murder Jonathan while Buffy does nor
want ro murder those u.nder her command. It is refreshing, though, to
know that Buffy does nor believe her stories, bur unsettling ro see rhar she
uses stories knowingly even though "li fe is nor a story. "
Andrew's "redemption" is now ar hand, bur ir does nor rake rhe form
he expects. "When your blood pours our, ir might save the world. What
do you rhink about char? Does it buy it aU back? Are you redeemed?"
Buffy asks him. "No," he replies, "because I killed him. Because I listened
to Warren, and I pretended I thought ir was rum, bur l knew - 1 knew it
wasn't. And I killed Jonathan. And now you're gonna kill me. And f'm
scared, and I'm going to die. And this- this is what jonathan felt. " Again,
we see Andrew cry, bur this time it is not under the inBuence of a story.
It rurns our, in a neat bit of storytelling, that the seal needed robe closed
by rears, not blood. It was the genuineness of the tears Andrew shed that
closed the seal. Even more, though , there is here an implicit commenrary
on a pervasive BtVS theme. Repeatedly throughout the series, as is befitting
a show that features vampires, we have heard story after story about blood.
Indeed, a season fin ale hinged around the recognition that "it's always
gotta be blood" ("The Gift," 5.22). Yet here, no blood is shed, only rears.
Note, also, that Andrew does not teU a srory. He does not try to describe
what Jonathan felt, he simply experiences it. His "this" points ro that which
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is unspeakable because our vocabulary cannot do it justice. Our fixated
concepts would betray the experience. While the strict dichotomy between
thought and feeling implied in Andrew's "redemption" is a bit too neat,
nonetheless, the episode makes ic clear that there is no story to be told
about redemption.
The episode concludes the same as ic began, with Andrew sitt.ing in
front of his video camera telling a story- but a very different one Andrew
states: "Here's the thing. I killedl my best friend. There's a big fight coming, and I don't know what's going to happen. I don't even think I'm going
co live through it. That's, uh, probably the way it should be. I guess I'm" And then he turns off the camera. One aspect of this final sequence
worth remarking is that Andrew has not yet given up on stories. He thinks
that dying is probably the scripted result of redemption. Again , tbe viewer
who knows bow Season Seven concludes wiU recognjze the foreshadowing here and realize that Andrew does survive the big fight, thus putting
a lie co even this residual commirmenc to categorizing experience according co stories much. Notice that this is the same fai lure that befeU Anya.
The series puts a lie to her story that she could finally "move on,'' just as
it puts a lie to Andrew's story that he should probably die due to his past
actions. He bas begun to learn Monraigne's lessons- do what is within
your power, do not be charmed b y false stories, and, that most famous of
Socrates charms, know thyself. Andrew turns off the camera leaving us to
fill in the blank after the "I guess I'm .... " The mid-sentence ending of the
episode challenges us co 611 in the blank, but how can we crust ourselves
to do so? The promise the episode holds out here, I take it, is that through
stories we can learn the inadequacy of stories, just as Montaigne tells us
his cask: "I do not portray being; I portray passing. Not the passing from
one age to another, or, as people say, from seven years to seven years, but
from day to day, from minute to minute" (Momaigne, "Of repentance,"
610-11). If we were to fill in the blank, we would be playing the part of
the gods, a stance explicitly mocked in the episode.
In conclusion, then, let me return to a distinctively philosophical
pleasure I take in BtVS. First, all che kissing and staking is fun , and the
stories the series tells are entertaining. But, fortuitously, BtVS is more than
emertaining kissing and staking. [n this essay, I have explicated this "more"
in terms of the series' refusal co conform co certain expectations related to
storytelling. In its refusal, for example, to conform to a standard theory
of true love or redemption , the episode "Storyteller" points to a particular aspiration of phjJosophy. And the abrupt ending of this episode foreshadows the conclusion of Season Seven: Dawn's asking Buffy "What are
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we gonna do now?" and Butfy's response of an enigmatic smile. I do not
want co claim that the theme I have traced in Montaigne, Mill, Warshow,
Cavell, and Stroud are the only aspirations available to a philosopher. But
it is a persistent theme in the Western philosophical t radition, and it is
presem in "Storyteller."
ln a famous interview before the beginning of Season Six, Joss Whedon notoriously claimed that his mandate as a storyteller was, "Don't give
people what they want, give them what they need" (Whedon). T hat statement bas been a focal point of fan debate ever since. While one can argue
with particular writing d ecisions, this essay bas shown that there is a good
philosophical impulse behind this mandate as such . Giving people what
they wanr can support conformity. Thus, BtVS appeals co me for much
the same reason that doing history of philosophy does. BtVS prompts me
to question my categorization of experiences and it helps to provide me
with a new vocabulary for dealing with experience. It does both these tasks
not by making a clai m but by pointing to its inability to make claims that
warrant our conformjty. BtVS may be, in Andrew's words "educating and
entertaining," but in "Storyteller," it is not so in the sen se that we can
learn from it - instead we can learn through it. That is an unusual goal
to ascribe co a TV show, but, honestly, as Warshaw, Cavell, and Stroud
point out , it is also an unusual goal for philosophy today.

N otes
I. All subsequent quoted dialogue is from this same episode unless otherwise noted.
2. In wlut follows, I wiU resist making general claims about Seasons Six and Seven,
though the very presence of this volume is an argument chat something changes in these
two seasons. The essays by Adams, Edwards, !Umbo, and Wilcox are particularly concerned
co trace those differences in more detail than I could hope co achieve. I w ill rerurn to the
question of the uniry of these two seasons in the final paragraphs of this essay.
3. The essay by Ira Shull and Anne Shull in this volume provides a very good overview
of the uses of Andrew's character. Among the many uses, my focus is on a variation of their
discussion of And rew as Candide. Their quoting of Voltaire from his article on ignorance
nicely supplements the rather different sources I draw upon in this essay.
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